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This short report forms part of the ambitious CBS Maritime research initiative entitled “Competitive Challenges and 
Strategic Development Potential in Global Maritime Industries”, which was launched in 2014 with the generous support 
of the Danish Maritime Fund. The competitiveness initiative targets specific maritime industries (including shipping, 
offshore energy, ports, and maritime service and equipment suppliers) as well as addresses topics that cut across maritime 
industries (regulation and competitiveness). The topics and narrower research questions addressed in the initiative were 
developed in close dialogue between CBS Maritime and the maritime industries in Denmark. 
 
CBS Maritime is a Business in Society (BiS) Platform at Copenhagen Business School committed to the big question of 
how to achieve economic and social progress in the maritime industries. CBS Maritime aims to strengthen a maritime 
focus at CBS and create the foundation for CBS as a stronger partner for the maritime industries, as well as for other 
universities and business school with a devotion to maritime economics research. 
 
The competitiveness initiative comprises a number of PhD projects and five short-term mapping projects, the latter 
aiming at developing key concepts and building up a basic industry knowledge-base for further development of CBS 
Maritime research and teaching. 
This report attempts to map the fundamental changes in financing methods, ownership structures and strategies within the 
Danish product tanker segment. 
 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 
The report will focus on three chronological phases; the global growth boom, the global financial crisis and the period in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis including the current situation of the industry.  
The product tanker segment is a fragmented and cyclical industry characterized by volatility and a high dependency on 
the financial sector. It is extremely vulnerable to an unexpected financial crisis, as the investments are long-term but the 
forecasts only short-term.  
By examining the case of five of the biggest Danish product tanker companies with different financing possibilities this 
project will seek to map the connection between financing, strategy and ownership in the Danish product tanker industry 
from the years 2004-2014. 
The knowledge displayed in this mapping project regarding financing, ownership structure and strategy within the 
product tanker segment will be processed for teaching material targeted to meet the needs on the newly launched B.Sc. in 
International Shipping and Trade and specifically for the courses Corporate Finance as well as Shipping Finance and 
Asset Management. In addition the information will be processed to supplement other teaching material on the new cand. 
merc. minor course Financial Risk Management in Shipping. 
As it is a mapping project the purpose is to describe the observations rather than to analyze the data.  This report is 
focused on the relationship between finance and strategy in the segment of product tankers. The time focus is on the time 
period from the upswing of the early 2000s via the financial crisis in 2008-09 to the present post-crisis adjustment from 
2010 to 2015.  
The project is a mapping project and it thus analytical in its nature. It means that the project is based on well-defined key 
concepts from various academic disciplines including corporate finance, strategic management and business history. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
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1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER 
The focus of the paper is on five major Danish product tanker companies and the consequences of the financial crisis in 
terms of changed capital requirements, type of ownership and business strategies. The first section gives an overview of 
the impact of the financial crisis on the Danish product tanker companies and their financing opportunities. This section is 
followed by a theoretical perspective on the relevance of the subject and after that the product tanker industry and its 
characteristics both in Denmark and globally will be presented.  
As an introduction to a major part of this report, namely the cases, the methodological approach will be introduced. 
The cases are presented in a random order and all consist of a presentation of the company, the historical development, 
strategic changes, ownership structure and financials. Finally the paper ends up with a short conclusion to the findings.  
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It is often argued that the shipping industry is the cornerstone of globalization and that the shipping market is closely 
linked to the state of the world economy and especially world trade
1
. This close link to the world economy and trade 
makes the shipping industry one of the most cyclical industries in the world. But even though shipping is very dependent 
on movements in world trade it is also, as Adam Smith (1776) in his ‘wealth of the nations’ describes it, a main 
facilitator of economic growth. Adam Smith (1776) argues that the central economic force in a capitalist society is the 
division of labor, and that the extent to which this can be practiced depends crucially upon the size of the market. A 
business operating in a town in a country without links to the outside world can never achieve high levels of efficiency 
due to the small market that will limit the degree of specialization.  
He then argued that it is by means of water-carriage that a more extensive market opened to every sort of industry is 
better and cheaper – it is upon the seacoast that industry of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself. In 
addition to be extremely dependent on movements in world economy, the shipping industry is also one of the most 
capital-intensive industries in the global economy. This combination of global integration, cyclical dependency and an 
intensive capital-structure makes up one of the most interesting sectors in the world but also the most financial 
challenging and distressful industry to operate and control. 
 
2.1. THE GLOBAL GROWTH BOOM 
More than 30.000 shipping companies operate around the world.  - often with substantial sized balance sheets, both on 
the asset and the liability side, characterized by an ongoing demand for inward capital investment in order to fund 
operations and expansion. This gives the shipping sector a historically close relationship to the financial sector. The 
specialized product tanker segment is particularly capital intensive since the tonnage is extremely knowledge and 
technology intensive and thus requires more extensive investments in vessels and new buildings.  
The global growth boom between 2003 and 2008 had a significant impact on an increased need for tonnage capacity in 
the shipping industry. As a result, the contracting activity rose as well as the need for considerable additional capital. The 
tremendous need for extra capital changed the relationship between shipping corporations and financing. In the boom 
period, shipping corporations took advantage of new and alternative financing methods supported by institutional 
investors - such as capital and pension funds - , as well as the new opportunities to raise capital on a global integrated 
bonds and stock market.  
As the financial crisis hit in 2008 many product tanker companies were in deep crisis as the demand was declining and 
the supply of tonnage increasing due to large investments in the boom years. Furthermore the banks had to focus on risk 
management which made them cut down on loans and thereby limiting the financing possibilities of the shipping 
companies. This has led to a shift in the power balance between creditors and the companies. 
 
2.2 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Due to the dependency on the global economy the most apparent danger for shipping corporations is the vulnerability 
towards macroeconomic change and especially the future development in world trade. Anticipating the macroeconomic 
future is difficult and contracting on vessels to be delivered 4-6 years in the future is therefore a game that must be acted 
upon with attention and caution. We have seen how some corporations, during the financial crisis, have wiped out their 
entire equity due to massive depreciations and impairment losses on their vessels.  
                                                          
1
 Tenold et al. (2012) 
2. SHIPPING AND FINANCING 
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Inevitably the 2008 global financial crisis put serious pressure on the product tanker segment. During the financial crisis, 
the downturn in world trade was even stronger than the slump in production. In 2009 alone, world GDP decreased by 2.3 
percent, while trade dropped by more than 10 percent as traders and factories used up inventories and holdings
2
. Not 
surprisingly, the shipping corporations found themselves in the epicenter of the largest financial meltdown in the postwar 
period. Naturally the freight rates collapsed and in a matter of months the demand for container transport of consumer 
goods dwindled and the reduced production and economic activity severely affected the dry cargo and product tanker 
segment. The financial crisis struck a serious imbalance between stagnant demands for transportation and an increased 
supply of tonnage. It is this imbalance that is so difficult for shipping corporations to anticipate and the consequences of a 
misperception of the future can be fatal. 
 
2.3 THE AFTERMATH OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The meltdown in the financial sector led to a frozen money market, asset prices plummeting and large bank failures, 
which required global government intervention in order to secure higher solvency and liquidity levels. The cost of 
corporate and interbank borrowing increased to sky high levels and furthermore the credit facilitators were forces to 
lower their exposure in the lending market by cutting lending activity and reducing their portfolios. This particularly put 
enormous pressure on the liquidity of the credit dependent and highly leveraged shipping industry and scaled a conflict of 
interest between the shipping industry and the credit facilitators as well as the investors.  
This conflict of interest led to an increased tension and imbalance of power, which in turn had consequences for the 
financing opportunities, strategies and ownership structures of shipping corporations. 
It has often been argue that the issue of what strategy and financing methods should be applied to obtain sustainable 
growth is only often addressed in times of financial distress or crisis, new industry dynamics, or other general market 
changes. Therefore it is extremely relevant to describe how the boom and especially the financial crisis has changed the 
conditions in the shipping market and how this in turn has affected the strategy, financing and ownership structure of the 
Danish shipping sector.  
This report will analyze five Danish product tanker corporations’ 10-year development (2005-2015) with focus on 
changes in ownership, financing and strategy. Specifically the report will analyze the bank-consortium controlled D/S 
Torm, the daughter company Maersk Tankers A/S, the listed D/S Norden, the private family-owned Uni-Tankers and 
finally the privately owned Hafnia Tankers A/S.  
The purpose of the report is to analyze the dynamic relationship between ownership, finance and strategy in the Danish 
product tanker segment. The segment has been chosen due to the Danish global competitive strength with five of the most 
important global product tanker shipping companies being operated from Denmark. The cases have been selected due to 
their varying ownership types and thus also varying financing possibilities as it will be elaborated on later in the project. 
                                                          
2
 Hoffmann (2010) 
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THE PRODUCT TANKER SEGMENT 
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The tanker industry represents the second largest segment of the global shipping trade accounting for 28 per cent of all 
seaborne trade on a weight basis and 23 per cent on a weight and distance basis (ton-mile).
3
 The industry is divided in 
two segments:  the transportation of crude oil and product tanker which is the transportation of refined crude oil such as 
diesel and gasoline. .  According to a Deutsche Bank report
4
 it is currently the crude oil that dominates the segment and 
represents up to 65% of the seaborne oil trade by weight and 75% on weight and distance basis (ton-mile). The refined oil 
products such as diesel, gasoline, kerosene and other products represent a smaller part of the seaborne oil trade and 
account for only 25% of seaborne oil trade and just 9% of all global seaborne shipments on a weight basis as shown in 
figure 1. 
This development is a sharp contrast to the pre 1960’s oil trade when the majority of seaborne oil trade consisted of 
refined oil products. The oil’s strategic importance to fast developing economies, the development in refining technology, 
and economies of scale has moved the production and refining capabilities of crude oil closer to the local demand. This 
development has facilitated the dominated crude oil market we see today – but yet the mix of refined products does not 
exactly meet local demands, which in turn sustains the market for seaborne trade with refined oil products.  
Today approximately 20 million barrels per day (mmbd) of refined oil products are transported across the oceans. Three-
fourths of that are comprised by gasoline and diesel, which require vessels with clean and epoxy-coated tanks. Most 
refined oil products move in smaller tankers such as LR1 and especially MR (Handysize). Other refined products include 
Naptha (feedstock for high octane gasoline), jet fuel, fuel oil and condensate. 
  
                                                          
3
 Ton-mile defined as the combination of tonnage and transportation 
4
 Deutsche Bank (2014) 
 
3. OVERVIEW OF THE PRODUCT 
TANKER SEGMENT 
 
Figure 1: Source: Deutsche Bank Report (2014) 
44% 
18% 
16% 
12% 
9% 
Oil products as % of total seaborne trade (weight) 
Dry bulk
Crude oil
Containers
Other
Oil products
  
11 
3.
 O
VE
RV
IE
W
 O
F 
TH
E 
PR
OD
UC
T 
TA
NK
ER
 S
EG
M
EN
T 
  
 
3.1 THE EXPORT AND IMPORT MARKET 
In 2012 the U.S., Europe and Middle East accounted for the three largest seaborne exporters of refined oil products, 
measured in (ton-mile), in the world with just over half of total exports. The general rule when accounting for oil exports 
is that the amount exported will be a function of refining capacity and domestic demand, implying that the exports and 
imports are a result of the surplus and shortage respectively.   
On the import side it is the Far East (Asia) that dominates and account for 40% of total import of Oil products. China is 
projected to become the largest net importer of oil in 2014 (EIA, 2014) therefore it is natural to believe that China 
accounts for a large part of the 40% oil product imports. However, this is far from the reality. The solid refining capacity 
in China actually makes them one of the smallest importers of refined oil products, which essentially means that the 
majority of Asian importers are made up of smaller, emerging market and developing countries. The European continent 
is the second highest importer with 20% of global imports with Latin America, U.S., and Africa accounting for a large 
part of the remaining balance.  
The total capacity of product tanker in the world is around 128 million DWT (deadweight tonnage) of which the Danish 
fleet could be measured for approximately 6,50% (based on an assumption on data from Danish Shipowners’ 
Associaton).
5
  
The seaborne market has taken a natural shift as a result of the American focus on home production of crude oil. Since 
the Bush Administration the U.S. have been taking measures towards developing and increasing their production and 
refining capacity. The increased domestic refining capacity and the findings of Shale deposits in North Dakota and Texas 
has turned the U.S. into a net exporter of oil products with net exports reaching a total of 1 million barrels per day 
(mmbd) in 2013 versus the 1.35 mmbd of net imports in 2000. Most of the U.S. supply finds its way to South America. 
This, together with increased refining capacity in Asia and Middle East as well as a reduction in OECD refining capacity 
should, according to a Deutsche Bank report
6
, have positive demand implication for shippers of oil products and crude 
oil. 
 
3.2 PRODUCT TANKER SUPPLY 
In 2013 the global supply of product tankers on the water were just over 2400 with a total capacity of 128 million DWT 
(deadweight tonnage). While there is no standardized system for the classification of oil tankers we typically say that 
product tankers are divided into 3 major categories; Long Range 2 (LR2); Long Range 1 (LR1); and Medium Range 
(MR). Additionally we will also find few VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) and ULCC (Ultra Large Crude Carrier) 
vessels on the sea. These ships have been built only to ship crude oil and should not be categorized as product tankers.  
A Handysize vessel is the smallest but account for 76% of the product fleet by number of vessels and 59% on a DWT 
capacity. 
 
  
                                                          
5
 Danish Shipowners´ Association Webpage (2015) 
6
 Deutsche Bank Report (2014) 
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Figure 2 below shows the product tankers capacity by DTW and vessels respectively. 
 
  
             Source: Deutsche Bank Report (2014) 
 
MR: This type of tankers is primarily used for the transportation of dry bulk, but are both able to function as crude oil 
and petroleum product tankers as well. Panamax tankers can carry between 50.000 and 80.000 DWT and trade primarily 
in short haul. The MR tankers can carry between 10.000 and 50.000 DWT. MR tankers primarily carry petroleum 
products as their small size make them less economic for the transportation of crude oil. The relatively small size of the 
MR category allows it to enter a plethora of ports around the world and thus retrieve and deliver more specialized cargo.  
LR1: LR1 tankers are mid to large-sized vessels that are able to carry between 80.000 and 120.000 DWT. LR1 tankers 
engage typically in medium to short haul oil trade in all operating markets. The LR1 is what the professionals call the 
workhorse of the fleet, their size makes them ideally suited to operate in areas of lower crude production or where draft 
and size restrictions prevent the use of larger vessels.  
LR2: LR2 are large sized tankers and has the ability to carry between 120.000 and 200.000 DWT. LR2 tankers offer the 
same economies of scale as a VLCC but has the smaller size offers increased versatility and access to a majority of the 
world’s ports and canals. LR2 tankers operate primarily in the Atlantic Basin delivering cargoes from West Africa, the 
North Sea, and the FSU (Former Soviet Union).  
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4.1 DATA 
For this project the primary source of data has been open qualitative sources such as articles from relevant scientific 
literature, newspapers, maritime newsletters, maritime publications and similar.  
This data was used to form a basic understanding of the business and the product tanker industry which was useful as 
some members of the project group only had a limited knowledge of the maritime world and the product tanker industry 
in specific. Therefore it was necessary to form a general understanding of the research area. 
Furthermore an important source of data has been interviews with selected case companies, Torm, Norden, Maersk 
Tankers, Uni-Tankers and Hafnia Tankers that have provided inside information from the implicated companies. 
Apart from the fact that all companies are major actors in the Danish product tanker industry they have been chosen due 
to their different financing possibilities and historical background which will be elaborated later on in the section relating 
to the case companies. Therefore the selected key persons from the companies were preferably employees with some 
years’ experience. 
The interviews were carried out at the last period of the data collection as it was important to form a certain knowledge of 
the industry prior to the interviews. Therefore the historical annual reports from the years 2004-2014 were analyzed and 
mapped both as regards the financial key figures, the organizational changes and the strategic focus. The annual reports 
varied a lot in terms of both size and the amount of available information for which reason some interviews were easier to 
prepare than other. This also means that some of the cases below are based primarily on the interviews while others also 
rely on secondary data. From some of the companies we even got access to internal presentations which were really 
useful in order to give an overview of the company, e.g. the Hafnia company presentation
7
.  
Furthermore, as mentioned previously this study is a mapping project with the purpose of collecting data within the areas 
of financing, ownership and strategy in Danish product tanker companies in a historical perspective. Thus the approach to 
this study has been rather descriptive than analytical and the interpretation of data has therefore not been extensive. 
Together with a number of similar mapping projects and several Ph.d.-projects this study is part of a bigger conduct of 
research at CBS Maritime for the maritime fond. 
 
4.1.1 Interviews 
The interviews were all conducted face to face which was perceived as very positive as it was easier to create a trustful 
relationship between the interviewers and the interviewees, especially as some of the desired information was quite 
sensitive and easier to touch on when talking face to face.  
Furthermore, by meeting the interviewees in person at their home ground in the respective companies it is likely to 
believe that it created a relaxed atmosphere for the interviewees and for the interviewers it was a great opportunity to visit 
the company and thereby get an idea of the company soul. For all interviews at least two members of the project group 
were present in order to supplement each other.  
Apart from company research an important part of the preparation before the interviews were semi-structured interview 
guides that were not to be followed carefully but rather functioned as a guideline for the topics and discussions that were. 
An example of an interview guide is to be found in appendix A. All interviews were conducted in Danish for which 
reason both the interview guide and the transcriptions of the interviews are in Danish. 
                                                          
7
 Appendix G 
4. METHODOLOGY 
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FIVE CASE STUDIES 
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The five case companies of this report are all major players in the product tanker industry both in Denmark and globally. 
An interesting characteristic is that almost all Danish shipping companies are located in a cluster north of Copenhagen. 
This is also the case for the companies used for this reports with only one exemption, namely Uni-Tankers that is located 
in Middelfart.  
But apart from their similarities the main reason for choosing these companies is the differences on type of ownership and 
thereby also different financing opportunities as portrayed in figure 3 below. 
 
 
 
  
By comparing different kinds of ownership structure the aim is to make a comparison of the strategic freedom and 
financing opportunities based on the type of ownership. 
  
5. CASE STUDIES 
 Company  Ownership  
 Hafnia Tankers  Privately Owned  
 Torm  Consortium of banks  
 Maersk Tankers  Subsidiary company  
 Norden  Listed  
 Uni-Tankers  Family owned  
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5.1 HAFNIA TANKERS 
Hafnia Tankers was founded in October 2013 on the basis of the former Tankers Inc. Tankers Inc. was an investment 
company established in 2010 by Michael Skov, former CEO of Torm A/S (2008-2010), and Jan Mechlenburg, former 
Executive Vice-President of the Sales & Purchases in Torm A/S (2005-2010).  
Michael Skov and Jan Mechlenburgs initial ambition in the fall of 2010 was to establish “a great shipping company”8.  In 
order to meet this ambition the two former Torm A/S managers founded two companies in 2010: Hafnia Management 
and Tankers Inc. The idea was that Tankers Inc. should become a ship owning company, acquiring tonnage when the 
product tanker market was attractive, with capital from large investors who could see an advantage in investing in a 
shipping company closely connected to the ship management in Hafnia Management. 
 
5.1.1 History 
Hafnia Management was thus established in 2010 based on an innovative commission structure model for the 
management of pools based on commissions of net earnings (gross freight minus brokers’ commissions, port expenses, 
bunker costs etc.) rather than the existing pools based on commission/fee structure on the actual gross freight
9
.  The idea 
by the two founders was that the net commission structure would incentivize the pool manager (their own future 
company) to minimize voyage related costs. Future partners with an ownership in the pool would thus not have to pay the 
management fee on the often very high gross freight rather than a fee on the lower net earnings – and because the former 
Torm A/S managers wanted to be part owners of the pool, they would have a shared incentive to lower the operational 
costs of the ships. The commercial operations began in the end of 2010 and by the beginning of 2011 Hafnia 
Management operated 22 product tankers - 13 MR vessels and 9 LR1 vessels - on the behalf of 6 partners. By mid-2011 a 
new LR1 Pool was established owned by a new company Strait Tankers founded as a 50/50 joint venture with one of the 
worlds’ leading shipping companies – Japanese Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL) the LR1 Pool  
In the spring of 2013 Hafnia Management operated 54 vessels – 24 MRs and 30 LR1s – in cooperation with 12 partners. 
The commercial management of ships under Hafnia Management was thus expanding.  
 
5.1.2 Strategy 
Concerning the sister company “Tankers Inc.” the ambition was to establish a new ship-owning company, which 
obviously required access to capital. The initial step in this endeavor was taken in the beginning of 2011 with an 
agreement with the British financial company Barclays. Barclays did not offer any investment capital but rather  a 
commitment to analyze  the proposed project. In the following years Michael Skov and Jan Mecklenburg assessed the 
market – firstly they thought the market was improving already in the beginning of 2011 – but the two former Torm A/S 
managers felt the disadvantage of being a very small newly started company. Due to the rising demand for product 
tankers the prices of tonnage rose and finally in the late spring of 2011 it was decided in cooperation with Barclays not to 
enter the market. The macro economic conditions were then worsened due to the sovereign debt crisis over the summer of 
2011. Another year went by before Michael Skov and Jan Mechlenburg decided that the timing was right. 
In the beginning of 2013 Tankers Inc. felt that the timing was improved in terms of relatively low prices on the assets in 
the product tanker market combined with signs of improvement in the macro economic conditions including the 
stabilization of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and signs of improvement in the American economy including 
increased domestic oil production.  
 
  
                                                          
8
 Interview with Mia Klausen and Michael Skov, December 15th, 2014, Appendix B 
9
 PP, Hafnia Tankers, Company Presentation, December 2014, slide 10, Appendix G 
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Figure 4: Source: Hafnia Presentation (2014) 
 
During the summer of 2013 the two former Torm A/S managers added one more investor, which together with Barclays 
agreed that Tankers Inc. could search for more investors in order to raise the required capital.  
The first thing Skov and Mechlenburg did was to negotiate new building orders on the relevant product tanker ship. The 
result became the order of eight MR “eco-design” newbuild product tankers from Guangzhou Shipyard International in 
China to be delivered 2015-16. The order including a very important clause namely that it was only binding after two 
months – this gave the two founders time to raise funding for the new investment. 
Two additional options for acquisition of a product tanker fleet appeared in the fall of 2013. Firstly the old Danish 
shipping company J. Lauritzen A/S decided that they would sell their product tanker fleet in order to focus primarily on 
the dry bulk segment. During the negotiations Skov and Mechlenburg convinced the seller that they were a serious 
candidate but the new company needed at least five weeks in order to agree on the price, set up the business model and 
attract the necessary investors. In the following weeks the founders initiated a road show in the US having meetings with 
institutional investors. The result was commitments from approximately 20 investors, which made it possible to acquire 
the Lauritzen fleet and to activate the new-building orders. In addition followed an agreement with the private equity fund 
Blackstone and their partner Tufton Oceanic. These two companies together owned the shipping company BTS with nine 
products tankers – 7 SR and 2 LR1 vessels. The aim was to go public with an IPO of BTS but they needed an operational 
platform in order to be able to make a “real” company of the nine vessels.  
In October 2013 Hafnia Tankers was founded and on the 23rd the newly established company announced that the newly 
established company had raised 235 million USD on the NOTC in Oslo - an information system for unlisted shares (see 
Norges Fondsmeglerforbund, 2014 and Shippingwatch.dk, 23.10.13).  
The end result was that Hafnia Tankers had 18 investors of which the largest was a consortium consisting of two 
Blackstone funds and Tufton Oceanic – this company owned approximately 28 percent. Then followed Barclays, J. 
Lauritzen, Hartmann Group and leading employees including Skov and Mechlenburg. 
The official NOTC registration of Hafnia Tankers followed on November 5th 2013 and the shipping company from 
outset encompassed the following fleet: Ten modern MR product tankers acquired from J. Lauritzen A/S (to a small 
degree in exchange to the above mentioned ownership); seven Short Range and two LR1 vessels which BTS had 
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contributed with (mainly in exchange of the above mentioned ownership) and eight new building MR eco-design product 
tankers – in total 27 product tankers of which 19 were on the water and eight to be delivered in 2015-16. 
5.1.3 Ownership 
The board of directors consisted of nine members. The chairman was Erik Bartnes a Norwegian specialized in ship-
finance, who had participated in the foundation of Tankers Inc. as co-founder of Pareto Bank. The eight other members 
represented the investors including Blackstone, Tufton, Mercator, Lazard and BNRI. Hafnia Tankers focused on a lean 
shipowner strategy outsourcing the technical management of their fleet to three suppliers: Wallem, Donelly and Thome. 
The company was managed by Mikael Skov, CEO, with the Norwegian shipping bank expert, Georg Whist as CFO, and 
three departments Finance, Technical and S&P – the latter operated by the co-founder of Tankers Inc., Jan Mechlenburg. 
 
  
Source: Hafnia Presentation (2014) 
 
With the official founding of Hafnia Tankers in November 2013 followed the important relationship to the operational 
company Hafnia Management which had existed since 2008. Most important Hafnia Tankers acquired 40 per cent of 
Hafnia Management from the beginning. That left 60 per cent ownership which was divided between five external 
shipowners/pool members each owing 12 per cent: LGR, Kirk Kapital, J Lauritzen, Marinvest, Gotland Tankers. As a 
result of the founding of Hafnia Tankers and the following new fleet of produc tankers Hafnia Management expanded 
substantially.  
Both companies were headquartered at Strandvejen in Hellerup (planned to move to the new Nordhavn area in 
Copenhagen in 2015). Hafnia Management had 30 employees under the CEO, Anders Engholm. The company was 
divided in three departments: Finance, MR Pool and LR 1 Pool – all three departments were managed by former Torm 
managers.  By the beginning of 2015 there were 30 employees in operation, chartering and controlling of Hafnia 
Management. Hafnia Management in total operated three pools:  
  
Hafnia Management
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The SR pool, owned 51 per cent by Hafnia Management and 49 per cent Marenave with 18 vessels 
The MR pool, owned 100 percent by Hafnia Management with 24 vessels 
The LR1 pool owned 100 per cent by Straits Tankers which was a joint venture between Hafnia Tankers (50 per cent) and 
MOL (50 per cent) 
In total the 30 employees at the headquarters and the subsidiary offices in Singapore and Houston thus operated 74 
production tankers placing as one of 5 largest product tanker operators in the world - only two years after the founding. 
 
  
Source: Hafnia Presentation (2014) 
 
5.1.4 Financials 
Since Hafnia Tankers A/S has a very short history it is difficult to tell anything about their financial performance in the 
past. However, there is an important element that we must direct our attention towards. Hafnia Tankers has proven to be 
more than excellent in attracting solid equity fund and capital fund investors to help finance their project. The major 
British bank Barclays as well as the two equity funds Tufton Oceanic and Blackrock backs Hafnia Tankers. In 2013 they 
launched a so-called Private Placement at NOTC in Oslo. 
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A Private Placement is the opposite of a public issue since only a small amount of selected investors are invited to 
purchase the securities. The Private Placement has become more popular as a means to raise capital for start-up shipping 
corporations that need an intense amount of capital to build up a new fleet. With the Private Placement form corporations 
can waive their registration at the local Securities and Exchange Comission (SEC) and they don’t need to disclose 
detailed financial information. Hafnia Tankers wanted to raise 200 million USD in order to finance their new vessel fleet 
but ended up oversubscribed with new capital around 236 million USD
10
. The raised capital has granted Hafnia Tankers 
some minimal leverage in the future and the ability to meet their 40 million USD and 261 million USD contractual time 
charter and new-building obligations respectively falling due within 0-5 years .
11
  
But this has also allowed them to fully purchase the fleet without putting them in an overly exposed situation both in 
terms of the price of steel (depreciations) and liquidity. The investors’ capabilities allow Hafnia Tankers to build and 
develop the right platform that will help them achieve long-term sustainable growth, regardless of the financial losses that 
are expected in the following years.
12
 
  
                                                          
10
 NOTC Oslo Statement 
11
 Hafnia Tankers Annual Report 2013 
12
 Norges Fondsmeglerforbund (2014) 
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5.2 TORM A/S 
The history of Torm goes more than 125 years back to the year 1889 when Torm was founded by Captain Ditlev E. Torm 
and Christian Schmiegelow. During the first couple of decades Torm increased its fleet and in the 1910s the company 
also expanded its shipping operations to international voyages.  Later motorized vessels were added to the fleet and right 
after the Second World War also the biggest bulk carrier by that time was added. In the 70s Torm took delivery of its first 
product tanker which is today the core competence of the company. In the early 1990s Torm makes history by 
establishing a pool partner collaboration.
13
  
 
5.2.1 History 
At the beginning of the ‘00s Torm was a fairly small shipping company owning around eight vessels and controlling in 
total around 15 vessels. Torm being an old company with great traditions was based on person-to-person training and 
traditional business talent with few new people joining the company. Up until the first years of the ‘00s this was an 
efficient model for Torm until 2005 where the company took major steps in increasing its fleet. A growing market and an 
increasing demand for product tankers made Torm grow and invest. Reinforced by the acquisition of OMI in 2007 which 
has later been referred to as ‘the seller’s deal of the decade’, the fleet suddenly comprised 74 vessels – an exponential 
growth with high demands to the organization as regards sophistication, professionalization and readiness for change 
when the organization was in fact only geared for 15 vessels. This had major implications for the company as the 
financial crisis hit the market for product tankers in 2009. In 2010 the company had in fact 94 vessels which were too 
many in relation to the current market demand and the decreasing market value of the vessels.
14
  
Today Torm is still facing a critical financial situation and is now trying to recover. A strong history and the ability to 
operate vessels efficiently and with a high quality might be the critical factors that can bring Torm back on the right track. 
 
5.2.2 Strategy 
The strategy of Torm before the financial crisis was characterized by a positive belief of the future market. From 2005-
2007 the market was exceptionally strong which meant that Torm made huge investments believing that the market 
would continue being strong. Torm did not believe that the market would be as strong as in the years up until 2007 but 
that it would still be attractive and give an output of around 20-25.000 USD per day per ship. However the reality in the 
years after the financial crisis proved to be much worse than expected and the freight rates were between 12-15.000 USD. 
Just to get accounting profit they should have been around 20.000 USD.
15
  
Thus already in 2009 the gearing was relatively high. Gearing is measured as ‘loan to value’ where the net asset value of 
the vessels is measured against the debt. By the end of 2011 all the vessels together were only worth 10 million USD 
more than the debtat a time when the balance was 1.8 billion USD.  
According to Torm there are three different ways of earning money in shipping. One is by operating the vessels better 
than the competitors. Another is by being good at controlling costs. The last one is asset play which is about getting in the 
market at the right time and just as important about getting out at the right time.
16
  
The price curve between 2005 and 2010 has been extremely volatile with relatively high fluctuations on the short term 
but even higher fluctuations on the longer term. Though Torm unlike other shipping companies do not rely solely on asset 
play, Torm has actually made money on asset play, however much less than many competitors (13% against around 
50%). The main reason behind this is that the mindset of Torm is influenced by an ambition of being a shipping company 
owning vessels and not a vessel trader. This corporate mentality resulted in a smaller profit on the sale of vessel 
compared to other competitors. 
An important asset play was in 2004 when Torm tried to buy Norden. That made a profit of about 540 Million Dollars. 
However the amount was all paid out as dividend instead of building up a considerate amount of capital in the company. 
                                                          
13
 www.torm.com 
14
 Torm Annual reports 2000-2013 
15
 Torm Interview with Christian Søgaard-Christensen and Nina Lomborg, December 11
th
 2014, Appendix C 
16
 Torm Interview with Christian Søgaard-Christensen and Nina Lomborg, December 11
th
 2014, Appendix C 
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As Torm started expanding the fleet the first vessels were bought for around 40 Million but the prices soon rose to much 
more. It is a risky play as the delivery time of the vessels is 3-5 years though the market forecasts in fact only look a 
couple of months ahead.  
In a cyclic product tanker market with high fluctuations it is necessary for a company to have a strong balance that is able 
to absorb it. Therefore taking a high financial as well as operational risk like Torm did can be very profitable in a strong 
market but also fatal in a declining market. The fluctuations during the financial crisis proved to be much more severe 
than Torm had ever expected and the balance was not strong enough.  
The primary risks associated wth Torm’s activities are listed in the figure below. 
 
Figure 7: Source: Torm Annual Report 2013 
 
In fact at the beginning of the financial crisis Torm was not at all affected.  Torm was observing that other industries were 
affected by the financial crisis but Torm itself did not feel anything until the first quarter of 2009 where the product 
tanker industry was also hit. 
2012 was a difficult year for Torm, 2013 looked better and 2014 has been okay though not as good as expected.  
Additional factors also had an impact on the turbulent years for Torm. , Klaus Kjærulff, the CEO for many years,  left the 
company at the end of 2008 and a new CEO, Jacob Meldgaard, was not appointed until 2010. In the meantime the 
previous COO, Mikael Skov was temporarily appointed as CEO. This gave rise to organizational turbulence. 
At the beginning of 2010, when, Jacob Meldgaard took over, some analysts thought that the market would turn around . 
With a high debt and high gearing it would have been possible to get high returns. However it did not happen. It would 
have been possible to get a stronger balance anyway by raising new debt, bonds, issue of shares or similar. But by doing 
so Torm would only move the money from the shareholders to the TC-owners as the market did not go up again. That 
would have made Torm a bad investment for shareholders. 
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5.2.3 Ownership 
The impact of the financial crisis on Torm has also had major implications for the company’s ownership. 
Through a number of years the Greek Panayotides family bought more and more shares in the company and owned 52 % 
before the restructuring of the company. Owning 52 % of the shares in a public listed company of course had an impact 
on the composition of the board and the decision making.  
As 2011 came closer and it became clear that the market would not turn around beneficially for Torm that was facing an 
increasingly difficult financial situation it was necessary to talk to the banks and make an agreement about what to do. 
This also had an impact on the ownership.  
The issue was that in order for Torm to get financially stronger it was necessary to raise money. However it was not an 
option to start paying off immediately for which reason Torm would like to postpone the principal amount for a period of 
time. Torm was allowed to do that by, in turn, raising 100 million USD.
17
  
Yet during the summer 2011 came ‘the second wave’ of the financial crisis and the number was raised to 300 million 
USD which meant that Torm would have to take money from the shareholders and use them to raise the amount which 
was an unfortunate solution. 
Therefore at the end of 2011 the company decided to do a full restructuring by making agreements with all 14 banks, all 
creditors leasing vessels to Torm and shareholders. Besides it was necessary to talk to the shipyards and make an 
agreement about the ships that had already been bought but not yet delivered. That process took almost a year. At the 
same time the media started to get increased attention on Torm as a company in crisis. 
                                                          
17
 Torm Interview with Christian Søgaard-Christensen and Nina Lomborg, December 11
th
 2014, Appendix C 
 
 
 
Photo: TORM A/S 
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The banks were willing to accept the restructuring as they had financial security in the vessels. All loans were set to be 
paid off by the end of 2016 and in 2012 and 2013 Torm did not have to pay off which was a huge advantage as the 
earnings from operations did not have to be used for repayments which gave available funds.  
The shipyards accepted that the ships bought for around 52 million USD were returned for around 40 million USD which 
was a good deal made possible through a longterm trustful relationship.  
As regards the TC owners, the leasing obligations were reduced from 2 billion USD to 600 million USD. 
All parties accepted this deal but they wanted something in return, that is shareholders’ equity in the company. The banks 
got 72 %, the TC owners got 17 % and the rest went to the existing shareholders. A lot of new shares were issued and that 
of course changed the ownership structure. From having 52 % before the restructuring the existing shareholders suddenly 
only had 5,2 % of the shares.  
A new independent board of directors was sat down trying to make Torm an attractive company for new owners. This 
implied that bulk was shut down which proved to be a god decision as the market for bulk was declining.  
Before the restructuring the banks were only creditors but afterwards loan fees were changes into new shares in the 
company. However a core competency of a bank is not to run a shipping company. Thus it was obvious that this time of 
ownership was only supposed to be temporary. 
The new board of directors was also focusing on how to sell the company to new shareholders. Stage one was to create 
the strongest possible company both technically and commercially by delivering good operational results and cutting 
down on people. After that stage two could begin at the end of 2013. Nordea has already sold their part to 40 different 
American hedge funds. It gives a good dynamic as the hedge funds have a different mindset that is rather oriented 
towards restructuring than regular banking operations.  
Oaktree, a big American fund, has also played an important role in relation to the recapitalization of the company. Many 
of the banks have sold their vessels to Oaktree, in total 22 vessels, who has put the ships back in the pool in order for 
Torm to operate the vessels technically and commercially. In that way Torm can maintain the necessary pool size. 
Oaktree is continuing to make deals with the banks which might mean that Oaktree will end up as the main investor. 
Oaktree knows a lot about the shipping industry and has also added additional vessels to the fleet, which makes them a 
good investor right at the moment. 
The situation for Torm right now is that the operational results look really good but the financial results are still lacking 
as the market is still weak, the depreciations on the vessels are too high and Torm still has a high debt with high interest 
costs. On an EBITDA level though Torm is performing really good by having extremely good day-to-day operations and 
that might be the critical factor that can give Torm the necessary upturn. 
Torm believes that the market is going up for which reason the company is willing to take operational risks. At the same 
time Torm is trying to take smaller financial risks by having a lower gearing than it was the case previously.
18
  
 
5.2.4 Financials 
Torm currently find themselves in one of the most difficult financial struggles and corporate turnarounds. The more risks 
that you are willing to absorb in your company that more you stand to win – if the wind blows in your direction of course. 
Unfortunately for Torm the tides changed just when they decided to scale up their operations. In the five fiscal years 
2004-2008 Torm delivered extraordinary results with profit margins as high as 51% and 102% (2007 – when they sold 
Norden shares)
19
 .  
But instead of filling a cushion with cash, they decided to invest everything in the hope of an even brighter future. On 
average Torm’s liquid assets (cash and equivalents) has only made up 4% of total assets while in DS Norden that number 
is 29%. While the amount of cash in itself is not any real financial indicator it is an indicator of how well a company is 
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 Torm Interview with Christian Søgaard-Christensen and Nina Lomborg, December 11
th
 2014, Appendix C 
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cushioned and it could, at the least, be an indicator that Torm didn’t believe that a financial bust was coming.  Norden on 
the other hand has been far better cushioned and have been able to keep the ship afloat by having a larger amount of 
liquid asset to deteriorate and far less gearing. The debt ratio tell us how much of a corporations assets are financed with 
debt - the higher percentage the more risk you carry but the more potential for growth as well.  Between 2004 and 2013 
Torm’s assets has been financed between 39% and 94% with debt which is far above the industry average according to a 
2012 PwC report on the shipping industry
20
 . The simple debt to equity ratio has been somewhat stable, but when the bad 
results appeared the ratio increased from 1.59 in 2008 to 3.32 in 2011 and further to 7.81 in 2012. Debt financing is not a 
bad thing per se, but in a cyclical market where you will never know which direction the wind blows, it can be 
devastating to be overloaded with debt.  
Over the course of 10 years Torm has only financed their growth by borrowing capital at their partnering banks. This is 
an easy way to raise capital but is also the most expensive one. Unlike Hafnia, Torm haven’t used large private equity 
funds to raise new capital nor have they issued any new shares. Raising equity is a cheaper way to raise capital and 
should harder times arrive, only the investors stand to take a hit. Naturally it is also more difficult to finance this way as 
investors are reluctant to agree on a dilution of their earnings – but using bank debt as the only means to raise capital for 
high growth periods is potentially very harmful for the future earnings and ownership control of the assets. When the 
financial crisis hit Torm, the amount of debt had them loose control of their own corporation and being unable to reign in 
your own castle is not a good thing for future growth.  
Working an overview of Torm’s financials the past 10 years leaves you the impression that they have been financially 
geared on a high level through the period. They have built up a balance sheet far larger than their revenues and a balance 
that they could not control. They purchased vessels when the vessel price was high and had to sell it off when the  vessel 
price was low. They have made both financial and strategic decisions that have now thrown them overboard. But let us 
not forget how far the management has been able to keep the company afloat in the wake of the crisis. The restructuring 
in 2012 is some of the best financial management the Danish shipping sector has seen and should better times arrive they 
will be able to live up to their restructuring settlements with banks and other investors.  The next 2-3 years will tell 
whether Torm can pull through or whether they will have to throw the towel in the ring.
21
  
 
5.3 MAERSK TANKERS A/S 
5.3.1 History 
Maersk Tankers was founded in 1928 as part of the A.P. Møller shipping company.  
In the postwar years Maersk Tankers operated a combination of crude oil vessels and product tankers.  
This dual ownership strategy was from the 1990s combined with a dual operational strategy under which Maersk Tankers 
combined the time chartering of their own fleet with the operations of pools. In year 2000 the Handy Tankers pool (27-
38.000 DWT) operated 27 vessels of which 7 were Maersk Tankers vessels. For the large product tanker vessels above 
70.000 DWT a new agreement was made in 2000 including 13 ships of which seven were Maersk vessels. By 2013 
Maersk Tankers owned and chartered a product tanker fleet consisting of the 69 vessels with the following contribution: 
• 18 LR2 (Aframax) - 13 owned, 5 chartered 
• 24 MR – 11 owned, 13 chartered 
• 27 Intermediate – 20 owned, 7 chartered 
In total 160 vessels are operated by Maersk Tankers that is part of three pools, namely Handy Tankers, Broström and 
MR.
22
  
Until recently Maersk Tankers also had big crude oil tankers which have now been sold of due to financial and strategic 
decisions. 
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Maersk Tankers believes that it is necessary to have a fleet with a certain size but above that there are no economies of 
scale and therefore it does not make sense to keep increasing the fleet and be market leaders measured on the size of the 
fleet. 
 
5.3.2 Strategy 
For the Maersk Group it is important that the tanker division is performing well and is in the top quarter of the peergroup 
– which has almost been realized. The return and cost of capital are the most important financial key figures for the group 
and the goal in future is to have a return on invested capital which is higher than today. The absolute return is not as 
important as where Maersk Tankers is currently on the curve. 
Risk aversion in Maersk Tankers is handled in the way that further investments are made when the market forecasts are 
positive and in turn investments are scaled down when the market forecasts are rather negative. The financial crisis has 
not had a big impact on the willingness to take risks. And it is important for Maersk Tankers not to be too risk averse as it 
is also important to take the chance when it is there.  
As regards competitive advantages Maersk Tankers perceives the Maersk brand as a particular benefit compared with 
competitors with a rather less significant brand. Furthermore it is important for Maersk Tankers to continuously renew 
the fleet and be in top 3 within their segment. Being able to attract qualified employees, being within top 3 of the segment 
and having a professional sales approach are also important factors.  
To keep up with competitors the ability to keep running costs low are important, that is the efficiency of the workforce 
and similar but not expenses for bunkers and ports, which are considered constant over time. Maersk Tankers focuses on 
keeping the total costs low. 
As regards demand and supply the demand is perceived constant, that is big oil companies with equal demands. The 
supply is on the other hand much more fragmented and characterized by almost no entry barriers. 
The strategic freedom of the Maersk Group is considered relatively high as there is only one private equity owner, 
namely the parent company and Maersk Tankers is not dependent on their ability to generate a good cash flow.  On the 
other hand all decision made also need to be in line with the strategy of the parent company.
23
  
 
5.3.3 Ownership 
Maersk Tankers is and has always been a 100 % owned subsidiary of A.P. Møller – Maersk A/S. 
 
5.3.4 Financials 
Since Maersk Tankers is a wholly owned subsidiary specific information on this division is very limited. Like other firms 
they have delivered negative results over the past years as a result of a declining tankers market. In terms of finance they 
acquire most of their capital through debt. They borrow from banks but a ‘related’ company i.e. the Maersk Group also 
supplies parts of the needed capital to sustain losses and future growth.
24
   
 
5.4 NORDEN A/S 
Dampskibsselskabet NORDEN A/S is an independent shipping company incorporated in Denmark and listed on Nasdaq 
Copenhagen as a part of the OMX Nordic Mid Cap index. 
NORDEN was founded in 1871, making it one of Denmark’s oldest internationally operating shipping companies.  
NORDEN operates in dry cargo and product tankers worldwide. 
The management focus is long term and is based on NORDEN's vision, mission and values. The goal is for NORDEN to 
continuously develop for the benefit of its stakeholders and to achieve high, stable earnings.   
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In dry cargo, NORDEN is active in all major vessel types. NORDEN is one of the world’s largest operators of Supramax 
and Panamax dry cargo vessels and has considerable activities in the Handysize and Post-Panamax vessel types as well as 
activities in Capesize. The Company's Handysize and Post-Panamax activities are operated commercially by NmORDEN 
Handysize Pool and NORDEN Post-Panamax Pool, respectively, which also operate vessels from Interorient Navigation 
Company Ltd. (INC), Cyprus. In total 168 dry cargo vessels (excluding INC vessels and single trip chartered vessels).  
In tankers, NORDEN is active in the Handysize and MR product tanker vessel types, in total 48 tanker vessels. 
The product tanker activities are operated through the Norient Product Pool. Norient Product Pool is the second largest 
product tanker pool in the world. 
NORDEN’s fleet is among the most modern and competitive in the industry and NORDEN operates a mix of owned and 
chartered tonnage in total 216 dry cargo- (excluding single trip chartered vessels) and tanker vessels. In addition 
NORDEN has a newbuilding program with 28 vessels on order (dry cargo 24, tanker 4). 
 
Figure 8: Source: Norden Annual Report (2013) 
 
NORDEN has its head office in Hellerup, north of Copenhagen (Denmark) (229 employee’s incl. site-offices) and offices 
in Singapore (31), Shanghai (China) (12), Annapolis (USA) (18), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) (5), Mumbai (India) (6), and 
Melbourne (Australia) (2). At its offices NORDEN has in total 303 employees and about 805 are employed on the 
Company’s owned vessels.25  
 
5.4.1 History  
Dampskibsselskabet NORDEN A/S is one of the oldest shipping companies in the world engaged in tramp operation. The 
company was founded by Mr Mads Christian Holm on 11 February 1871 and the first ship was built in 1872. He was 
manager of the company until his death in 1892.  
Norden has always been an internationally oriented shipping company but has expanded its global activities by 
establishing regional offices all around the world, though still with the headquarter in Denmark. The number of ships and 
employees has grown rapidly and so have the ship segments and services. 
Today NORDEN has 303 employees at its offices and about 880 employed on the company's owned vessels, offices in 
six countries, owns and operates 216 dry cargo- and tanker vessels (excluding single trip chartered vessels) and has and 
an extensive new building program with 28 vessels on order.  
In 2008 NORDEN inaugurated its headquarters in ‘Bryghuset’ in Hellerup enabling the company to offer modern 
facilities to employees and visiting customers.
26
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5.4.2 Strategy 
As described above Norden focuses both on the tanker division as well as on the bulk division.  Traditionally Norden has 
been a shipping company within bulk but today as bulk is facing a hard time the company is benefiting from the activities 
within tankers. 
Measured on the invested capital the tank and bulk division are today almost equal but measured on the daily activities 
bulk is the biggest division. 
Together with the cypriotic company Interorient Norden has the Norient pool which has existed for 10 years and is 
running really well. The pool is essential for Norden is order to build the necessary scale to be competitive. The downside 
of having a pool is that it takes time to divide the profit but as long as there is only one pool partner with the same share it 
is not considered difficult for Norden.
27
  
The corporate mentality in Norden characterized by traditions and traditional norms for shipping also means that Norden 
is a company which encompasses all parts of the process within shipping, the logistics, contact with the end customers 
and so forth, instead of just buying vessels and using them for time charter agreements.  
Norden has always considered itself a risk-averse company as it will be elaborated on further down in relation to the 
ownership structure but the risk aversion has definitely increased after the financial crisis.  
As the former CEO Carsten Mortensen started in the company back in the late 90s Norden had a clear ambition to grow 
which proved to be a really good idea. As the company reached year 2004 the money were flowing in which lasted until 
2008. The profit was around 1 billion USD. Some of them were paid out as dividend while others were used for 
investments. There was a certain understanding of risk aversion but the gearing was much higher than it would have been 
today and the amount of investments was much higher too. This also has to do with the fact that it is much easier to 
double the number of vessels when there are only four than when the fleet consists of 200 as today.  
As the crisis hit from 2008 until 2011 it became clear that the strategy in the booming years with a higher degree of risk 
aversion than many of the competitors had been good and the company survived. Being a risk-averse company is difficult 
in boom periods as it is very tempting to increase the gearing and the investments but the company is and will always be 
risk averse. 
Severe attempts to be prepared for a new crisis have been made such as a new overdraft facility, 25 ships without debt 
and more precautions if it becomes necessary. The forecasts are pretty long-term with the aim of keeping the company 
alive over a longer period of time. 
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5.4.3 Ownership 
Norden is first of all owned by the Motortramp fund which is an old family that has owned a big part of Norden for 50 
years. Today they own around 28 % of the shares. Together with ‘Rasmussen Gruppen’, a Norwegian investment group 
which owns around 11,5% of the shares, Motortramp has a shareholder agreement which means that the one part has to 
tell the other if they decide to sell some of the shares. This structure is important for Norden after being besieged by Torm 
around five years earlier. The bound between the two shareholders means that Norden’s primary investors are tied closely 
together.  
The other shareholders consist of among other Schröder, a Swiss and German stock mutual fund which has around 5 % of 
the shares, and other similar funds from Continental Europe which has the primary interest in the company. Norden has 4 
% themselves and the rest of the shares are owned by private investors.  
Both the large and smaller shareholders are traditional in the sense that the most important thing for Norden is to continue 
to exist. A common saying is ‘You can risk the deal but not the company’ which permeates the whole company, how 
many ships to buy, the financial balance and further more. In this sense the risk averson is much higher than for other 
shipping companies as is it crucial to avoid a liquidation. Some investors like this strategy, some others do not. Some 
investors are more aggressive and want the company to take much higher risks and many also require a “pure play”, that 
is they do not want both bulk and tank as it seems too complex. But especially the investors from continental Europe like 
this strategy with a good track record and a solid board of directors.  Right now it seems unlikely that Norden will split 
the two parts and sell the tanker division to an equity fund but on the other hand there is a chance that it could happen on 
the longer term. 
Furthermore Norden aspires to be as transparent as possible which means that there are very few subsidiaries and all 
annual reports are available online. 
The figure below shows the current group structure of NORDEN A/S. 
 
  
Source: www.norden.dk 
  
5.4.4 Financials 
Norden is currently facing the same difficult and non-profitable market as Torm, although they are not suffering as much 
as Torm they are still facing losses as a result of a declining market. Norden managed to keep their results profitable up 
until 2011 and has only delivered negative results in 2012 and 2013 compared to the five year streak of negative results in 
Torm in the period 2009-2013. Norden’s tanker division, however, has actually delivered negative results in the period 
2009-2013 but their Dry Cargo division has managed to keep the overall company profit positive for an extended period.  
While Norden has also been taking some serious hits on the steel in terms of depreciation it hasn’t had the same severe 
impact on their results as it did in Torm. The prices of steel can change overnight and if you buy on the wrong day you 
can lose 20% of the value the next day. Norden has over the course of 10 years delivered strong profit margins although 
they are far from stable. In the boom years from 2004 to 2008 they delivered profit margins between 14% and 24%. 
Rather than investing all of their earnings they have cushioned the company and increasingly piled up cash in the boom 
years. In 2008 they held almost 800 million USD in cash up from 135 million USD in 2004. Naturally this pile of cash 
has been absorbed during the downturn but is not at all near being empty. The strong balance sheet that Norden has kept 
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over the years has offered them some comfort in the recession and the ability to pull through the crisis without sacrificing 
the company’s assets and in the end, their shareholders.   
Over the 10 years we analyze Norden they have only raised new capital through debt in order to finance their growth. 
They have increased their long and short-term bank debt over the period but in a slowly and steady manner that has kept 
their debt exposure low. They have kept their debt ratio to a bare minimum of between 0.11 and 0.35 throughout the 
entire period. And while they have not raised any new equity (other than retained earnings) their capital structure is made 
up of far more than 50% equity throughout the entire period compared to Torm who on average has more debt than equity 
in the same period.  
There is however an important element in Norden’s annual reports that cannot be left out. The contractual lease 
obligations they have on time charters are due to accounting regulations not accounted for directly in the balance sheet. In 
the notes to the financial statements on their 2013 annual report it is stated that Norden has more than 2billion USD 
dollars in contractual lease obligations for the future.  Since this liability does not carry any interest it is not seen as a debt 
liability but it’s important to realize that these amounts has to be paid in order to comply with the contracts. It makes no 
sense to add the contractual lease obligations to the balance sheet but it does change the picture in terms of short and long 
term liabilities.  
 
Figure 10: Source: www.ds-norden.com 
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5.5 UNI-TANKERS A/S 
Uni-Tankers is part of A/S United Shipping and Trading Company (referred to as USTC), a global group of companies 
with a total of more than 1200 employees worldwide and a turnover of 11.2 billion USD.USTC is fully owned by ship 
owner Torben Østergaard-Nielsen.
28
  
As opposed to many other Danish shipping companies that are all located in a cluster north of Copenhagen, Uni-Tankers 
is located in Middelfart. 
Measured by turnover the biggest part of Uni-Tankers consists of Bunker Holding and USCT is also active in Global Risk 
Management, Shipping Holding and IT. The foundation of USTC is the bunker division from which the other part of the 
business have developed.  
Uni-Tankers was founded in 1989 and operates today a fleet of 37 oil and chemical tankers with a capacity of up to 
25,000 dwt. 17 of the vessels are owned by the company.  
Being part of USTC is a competitive advantage for Uni-Tankers as the joint economic strength of the total group is a 
critical factor for the big oil companies that demand a good capital base and economic security to make an agreement.  
Being part of USTC also means that it is possible to cover a profit loss in Uni-Tankers with profit from one of the other 
subsidiaries. This means that an expanding and investing strategy is still possible even in a bad market. 
 
5.5.1 History 
Uni-Tankers is an almost 20 year old company owned by Torben Østergaard-Nielsen and managed by Torben Andersen 
which has been the CEO ever since the beginning. 
Until 2012 Uni-Tankers was a fairly small company. During the financial crisis from 2008/09 Uni-Tankers only had 
around 9 ships and 10 employees and it was therefore difficult to cut down on costs. The most important thing was to 
remain a small company and try to get through the crisis as good as possible.  
Uni-Tankers had in fact ordered four newbuilding’s as the crisis hit but were lucky to get out of the deals at low costs due 
to a good relationship between Torben Anders and the owner of the shipyard in Turkey from where the ships had been 
ordered. 
After the financial crisis Uni-Tankers’ bank (Dansk Bank red.) had been in contact with other banks that were facing a 
hard time after the crisis and contacted Uni-Tankers to know if the company could be interested in some of the companies 
in crisis. The outcome of that process was that at the beginning of 2012 Uni-Tankers bought Errias fleet and their 
activities which consisted of nine ships and in addition three newbuilding’s on the way from China.  Furthermore Uni-
Tankers bought an additional vessel from the Turkish shipyard and thereby suddenly had a fleet of 35 vessels. Errria’s 
fleet was bought at the market price and thereby not particularly cheap but the increase in fleet size meant for Uni-
Tankers that they were able to become “a real shipping company” (Torben Andersen, 2015) and it was a signal to the 
market that Uni-Tankers had a clear ambition of expanding. The company opened offices in Houston, Nice and Istanbul 
and today operates 40 ships of which Uni-Tankers owns 17 and has 23 on time charter.
29
  
Last year was the first year since the crisis where Uni-Tankers’ accounts actually showed a profit.30  That was a very 
good achievement in a market that is still recovering and many of the competitors have not been able to do the same. 
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5.5.2 Strategy 
Since the beginning, the ambition of Uni-Tankers has been to own and operate ships and not to be or to become an equity 
business. The ambition was to be a good supplier of steel for the oil industry and that has been the foundation of the 
company. 
Until the financial crisis the company was slowly expanding the fleet by taking loans in the bank (the gearing was around 
70-80 %) and the owner Torben Østergaard-Nielsen added the last part of the amount for buying the vessels. Uni-Tankers 
has and has always had only one bank which makes it a very streamlined company and there have never been any 
ambitions to seek other more alternative ways of getting capital. 
The ambition is to grow to 50 vessels within the next few years, either by investing in own vessels or taking in time 
charter vessels. The company is however not excluding that they are willing to make some kind of consolidation in the 
future if the right match comes up. 
As regards the fleet Uni-Tankers only operates within the smallest segment from smalltank to intermediate size that is 
ships from 4500 to 20.000 DTW. And they are intending to keep doing so and become experts within that specific 
segment instead of expanding to other bigger segments.   
After 2008 there were only very few newbuilding’s within the smaller segment, and the belief was therefore that the 
balance between supply and demand would be faster evened out than for other segments. Moreover, there is a big demand 
for smaller product tankers due to the limitations in many harbors. 
The fleet is with an average age of 6 years relatively new compared to many competitors which is an important 
competitive factor for Uni-Tankers in order to live up to the standards of their customers and environmental 
requirements. 
As described above Uni-Tankers has offices in Houston, Nice and Istanbul but is not active in Asia. That is a conscious 
choice of the company which has to do with the responsible culture of the company. There has been a lot of cases of 
piracy around the Gulf of Aden and Uni-Tankers’ ships would be a relatively easy prey due to their small size. Therefore 
as long as the market in the Western part of the world is big enough there is no need to expand to Asia. However the 
company does acknowledge that the Asian market is big and that they probably need to expand to growth economies such 
as India in the future.  
This responsible company culture with a flat hierarchical structure is also put into place in the sense that Torben 
Andersen is participating in a Shell Chemicals global project where he as CEO is obliged to visit minimum one ship per 
month. That is very valuable both for him and for the employees as the business has to run as smooth as possible. This is 
particularly important as the organization has grown from only 10 employees in 2012 to over 70 in 2014 in the Danish 
head office. As the number of employees grew also people from significant other Danish shipping companies were hired 
in order to make a strong management team.
31
  
 
5.5.3 Ownership  
Being a family-owned private company is an essential value of the company. First of all the corporate culture is very 
strong and both the top line as well as the costs are important. That is important in a weak market. But unlike other 
companies controlled by equity funds and similar Uni-Tankers considers itself a long-term investment without a 
determined date for exit of the market. Many other companies have been forced by investors to make huge investments in 
the booming period before the financial crisis and they are now suffering from that. 
Another advantage is that it has been possible to get the necessary capital from the parent company in order to make 
investments such as buying Erria. 
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On the other hand there also some limitations when insisting on being ‘master in one’s own house’, that is among others 
less willingness to take risks. There is no doubt that Uni-Tankers’ strategy is pretty risk averse and the company does not 
have an ambitions about being the biggest.
32
  
 
5.5.4 Financials 
Uni-tankers differ from the rest of the field by being a privately held company in the sense that their one shareholder, 
USTC, is wholly owned by Torben-Østergaard Nielsen. This naturally has some benefits but also implications for the 
financing of growth. As discussed in the interview with CEO Torben Andersen it allows the management to build the 
corporation slowly and steady. They do not have to take extensive risk in order to satisfy equity investors’ desire for 
higher returns and asset plays, rather they have just one shareholder who cares only about building up a shipping 
company in its purest sense.  The capital required for building a shipping company from the bottom up is a large amount. 
Uni-Tankers have financed their fleet and growth mostly through debt, but Torben Østergaard Andersen has not been 
reluctant to put his money on the line when it comes to investing. We saw that in the case of the Erria takeover. However, 
having just one shareholder may in the future have its limitations to raising equity capital, which in turn leaves the 
company more and more to debt financing.  
So far it has worked for Uni-Tankers because the ownership structure matches their strategy and future goals, but further 
expansion in the future will require more heavy capital. Chances are that additional capital will have to come from other 
sources than the bank in order to avoid burdening the company with too much debt. A strategy CEO Torben Andersen did 
not ultimately disregard.  
Uni-Tankers has, like most other shipping companies, delivered negative results since 2008 mostly because of their 
exposure to fluctuating prices in steel. But in 2014 they will come out with positive results and a balance sheet that has 
not been completely deteriorated by the financial crisis.
33
  
Uni-Tankers has an interesting as well as challenging future ahead of them. If they wish to expand even further it os 
going to require capital and how they will acquire is an interesting topic to follow. 
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This mapping project has given an overview of the product tanker industry, the impact of the financial crisis and focused 
on five selected Danish case companies. 
The companies represent different ownership structures and thereby also different financing possibilities and strategic 
freedom. The mapping of data has given an indication of a clear connection between these three variables.  
Hafnia Tankers being the youngest company that was founded after the financial crisis is hard to compare with the others 
but yet gives a good indication of the chances for a company to enter a market that has just been hit by a crisis. On the 
one hand the financial crisis made it more difficult for the company to find enough capital domestically for which reason 
the company found the majority of the investors in the US. But on the other hand the financial crisis also offered a 
number of opportunities such as a big supply of available tonnage and the experience of the management team of which 
almost everyone came from Torm was a big advantage too. As Hafnia Tankers is still a very young company it is hard to 
say how the ownership structure will develop but as it has been important to find investors with shipping experience there 
does not seem to be any strategic conflicts between investors and management team yet.  
Torm is facing a very different situation compared to Hafnia Tankers. Torm is a very old company that has been growing 
for many years but was severely hit by the financial crisis due to a high gearing both financially and operationally. Before 
the crisis one big investor mad the majority of the shares and therefore also a great influence on the strategic 
development. However as the financial crisis hit Torm was forced to make an agreement with the banks that thereby also 
took over the major part of the shares and the control of the company. This was a necessary arrangement in order to 
survive but as the most banks do not have much knowledge of shipping this was only a temporarily solution. Very 
recently the banks have started to sell their shares and vessels to an American fund named Oaktree which is now getting 
more and more influence in the company. 
Maersk Tankers is unique in the sense that it is a subsidiary to a very strong parent company and financially as well as 
strategically dependent on its directions. This gives a high degree of security but also slightly less strategic freedom than 
for companies that are controlled capital funds and thereby more willing to take risks.  
Norden is a regular listed company with a number of investors of which two funds own a big part of the shares, though 
not a majority. As it is necessary for Norden to take care of the interest of many different investors the company has not 
been able to take big risks, neither financially nor operationally, which has proved to be a major reason for the company’s 
ability to get through the crisis but it has also limited the possibilities of expanding in boom periods. 
Uni-Tankers is medium old company that as mentioned earlier is the only company not located in the “shipping cluster” 
north of Copenhagen. In a way this is a good indicator of the company’s independence in the sense that it does not try to 
imitate other product tankers companies and their financing methods but believes in the existing structure. The company 
is part of the USTC group that is owned by one man that thereby also has the overall power and control of the company. 
As he has invested his own money in the company he is responsible for all risks and therefore also less willing to take a 
lot risks which has proven to be healthy in a financial crisis. The company has been growing in a slow until 2012 but has 
been growing faster since then and still has expansion plans. In a family-owned company the ownership structure is of 
course very dependent on the owner. 
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